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THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT'S TECHNICAL
DATA REGULATIONS: DO THEY VIOLATE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under authority granted in the Export Administration Act of
1979,' the United States Department of Commerce promulgates
regulations' to control the export of unclassified technical data.
These restrictions upon the dissemination of technological infor-
mation are deemed necessary to protect United States national se-
curity and to promote foreign policy interests. However, the tech-
nical data controls entail significant first amendment issues,
especially in areas relating to the exchange of scientific and
technical information. Recently, the Department of Commerce de-
termined that the regulations are applicable to United States
scientists attending technological conferences in the United
States and abroad. It is unclear whether these restrictions pass
constitutional muster. This Note focuses upon the constitutional
questions presented by the Export Administration technical data
regulations both in general and as specifically applied to scientific
meetings.' A recent scientific conference held in California,' upon
which the Department of Commerce imposed the regulations, pro-
vides the context within which the issues are presented.
II. EXPORT CONTROLS ON TECHNICAL DATA
A. The Export Administration Act
A new Export Administration Act was passed by Congress in
1979.1 A number of Congressional findings are set out in the
statute, one of which addresses technical data controls: "Export of
goods or technology without regard to whether they make a sig-
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Albert M. Pearson of the
University of Georgia School of Law for his guidance in the preparation of this paper.
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 379 (1980).
As of this writing, there have been no cases involving challenges on first amendment
grounds of the validity of these regulations.
' The First International Conference on Bubble Memory Materials and Process
Technology, sponsored by the American Vacuum Society, was held in Santa Barbara,
California on February 20-22, 1980. See note 26 and accompanying text infra.
, Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72,93 Stat. 503 (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1976) & Supp. III 1979)).
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nificant contribution to the military potential of individual coun-
tries or combinations of countries may adversely affect the na-
tional security of the United States."' The Congressional declara-
tion of policy is more explicit. Export controls are to be used:
(1) to restrict the export of goods and technology which would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any
other country or combination of countries which would prove
detrimental to the national security of the United States;
(2) to restrict the export of goods and technology where
necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the
United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations;
and,
(3) to restrict the export of goods where necessary to protect
the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce
materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of
foreign demand.7
I
Thus, although a stated purpose of the Act is to encourage trade,8
Congress has made it clear that exports are to be restricted
whenever United States national security or foreign policy in-
terests will be adversely affected.
One of the major changes in the 1979 Export Administration Act
is an emphasis on regulating the export of technology as well as
regulating the export of goods. In the section on Congressional
findings, the Act refers to the necessity of "special emphasis" on
controlling "exports of technology (and goods which contribute
significantly to the transfer of such technology) which could make
a significant contribution to the military potential of any country ...
which would be detrimental to the national security of the United
States."9 However, as demonstrated by the following passage
from the House Report, the decision to regulate exports of
technology was not without a recognition of potential constitu-
tional hazards:
Knowhow can be transferred in many ways, not all of which are
subject to export controls. Two potentially important ways of
transferring knowhow are through technical cooperation agree-
ments between United States firms and agencies in controlled
countries, and through scientific interchange. The latter method,
' 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 (5) (Supp. III 1979).
7 Id § 2402 (2).
' Id § 2401(3). See also S. Rep. No. 96-169, 96th Cong, 1st Sess. Reprinted at [1979] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1147.
' 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401(8) (Supp. III 1979).
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of course, carries First Amendment implications which make
controls difficult, if not impossible."
The Secretary of Commerce is authorized by the Export Ad-
ministration Act to require any of the following types of export
licenses: (1) a validated license, (2) a qualified general license, and
(3) a general license. A validated license may be obtained only
after an exporter has filed a formal application with the Depart-
ment of Commerce. This license authorizes the export of certain
goods or technical data to a specific importer in a particular coun-
try. The decision of whether to issue a validated export license is
left to the agency. A qualified general license authorizes multiple
exports and also is issued pursuant to an application by the ex-
porter. Under a general license, exports of some commodities and
technologies are possible without filing an application. As explain-
ed by Berman and Garson, "a general license is not a license in the
sense of a document that has been issued; it is, rather, a regula-
tion granting permission to make the export without a specially
issued document specifically authorizing it."" The penalties for
violations of the Act or any regulation, order, or license issued
thereunder, are strict."2
B. The Export Administration Technical Data Regulations
As may be expected, the purposes stated in the regulations for
export controls parallel those in the Export Administration Act.'3
The transfer of technical data raises national security concerns
within the Department of Commerce when it may promote the
10 H.R. REP. 96-200, 14 (1979) at 4.
" Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 791, 814 (1967).
"z 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (Supp. III 1979). For knowing violations, the penalty is a fine of
$50,000 or not more than five times the value of the exports involved, whichever is greater,
or five years imprisonment, or both. Willful violations can result in a fine of $100,000, or ten
years in prison, or both. Civil penalties are not to exceed $10,000 for each violation. Id. In
addition, an administrative penalty may result in the denial of export privileges. 45 Fed.
Reg. 84,020-22 (1980)(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 387 1(b)).
Export Administration Regulation, 15 C.F.R. § 370.1 (1980) provides:
Export controls administered by the Department of Commerce under the Export
Administration Act, are used to the extent necessary: (1) to protect the domestic
economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious
inflationary impact of foreign demand; (2) to further significantly the foreign
policy of the United States and to fulfill its international responsibilities; and (3)
to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their
significance to the national security of the United States.
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military potential of another country.'4 The agency views foreign
policy interests as at stake when exported technology "would
enhance another nation's capabilities in a manner inconsistent
with our foreign policies ... "I
The Department of Commerce defines "technical data" in the
regulations as
information of any kind that can be used, or adapted for use, in
the design, production, manufacture, utilization or reconstruc-
tion of articles or materials. The data may take a tangible form,
such as a model, prototype, blueprint, or an operating manual; or
they may take an intangible form such as technical services."
Technical data can be exported in various ways, including (1) an
actual shipment or transmission out of the United States; (2) any
release of technical data in the United States with the knowledge
or intent that it will be shipped or transmitted to another country;
and (3) the release of such data in a foreign country." Thus, the
regulations apply to the dissemination of technological informa-
tion by United States citizens both in the United States and
abroad. Technical data may be "released" for export in oral,
visual, or written form.".
Under a General License GTDA, unclassified technical data
may be exported to all destinations without restriction if it is
"generally available to the public in any form.""9 This non-
proprietary technical data (technical information that is in the
public domain) includes "(1) data released orally or visually at
open conferences, lectures, trade shows, or other media open to
the public, and (2) publications that may be purchased without
restriction at a nominal cost or obtained without costs or are
available at libraries open to the public."' These general license
14 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Exports of Technical Data by Publication or Other Means of
Public Dissemination, EXPORT AD. REP. 130 (Apr.-Sept. 1977).
15 Id.
Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a) (1980).
7 Id § 379.1(b) (1).
Id § 379.1(b) (2); provides:
Technical data may be released for export through: (1) visual inspection by
foreign nationals of U.S.-origin equipment and facilities; (2) oral exchanges of in-
formation in the United States or abroad; and (3) the application to situations
abroad of personal knowledge or technical experience acquired in the United
States.
Id.




provisions of the regulations also apply to scientific or educational
data if they are "not directly and significantly related to the
design, production, or utilization in industrial processes...."'I
To control restricted technical data, the regulations establish a
General License GTDR, under which exports are permissible only
to certain non-communist countries and only if the importer signs
a written assurance that the technical data will not be re-
exported.22 Of course, this pledge requirement is effective only if
the importing country also has a system of export controls and is
willing to use those controls to further United States interests.
Thus, as one commentator has noted, whether a foreign govern-
ment "is willing and able to exercise export controls is a signifi-
cant factor in the decision to be made in the United States
whether a particular export should be permitted."23
Except for these limited general license provisions, technical
data may not be exported from the United States without a
validated export license. The only other exception to this re-
quirement relates to technological and scientific information ex-
portable to Canada.25
III. CASE STUDY: EXPORT ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL DATA
REGULATIONS APPLIED TO SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCES
As noted above, the Department of Commerce recently applied
the regulations on technical data to the First International Con-
ference on Bubble Memory Materials and Process Technology
(hereinafter referred to as the Bubble Memory Conference), spon-
sored by the American Vacuum Society (AVS). The conference
was attended primarily by representatives of companies making
bubble memories, a technology with vast potential for the com-
puter industry. As the industry is on the verge of moving from
the bubble memory prototype to the mass production stage, the
purpose of the conference was to reach agreements on such mat-
ters as standards, specifications, and reliability of supply.'
On February 11, 1980, conference organizers were contacted by
the Compliance Division in the Office of Export Adniinistration of
Id. § 379.3(b) (1).
' Id. § 379.4(f).
Rubin, United States Export Controls: An Immodest Proposal, GEo. WASH. L. REV.
633, 642 (1968).
"4 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 379.5(a) (1980).
SId.
2 Science Meetings Catch the U.S.-Soviet Chill, SCIENCE 1058 (Mar. 7. 1980).
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the Department of Commerce, and it was suggested at that time
that the technical data regulations might be applicable to the
meeting.' In a letter received on February 19 by Dr. John L.
Vossen, President of the American Vacuum Society, the Com-
merce Department again suggested that the conference might be
within the coverage of the Act, in which case any oral exchanges
of information with foreign nationals at the conference could con-
stitute the export of technical data.28 If the regulations were ap-
plicable, a validated license from the Office of Export Administra-
tion and written assurances from foreign attendees would be re-
quired before the technical data could be "exported."' The letter
also requested that copies of the proposed presentations be sub-
mitted to the Office of Export Administration so that it could
"make a definitive determination as to what restrictions govern
the subject matter of the conference." 0 Through subsequent
telephone conversations with the Commerce Department, con-
ference organizers were informed that the scientific and
technological information to be disseminated at the meeting con-
stituted data not available publicly, and therefore was subject to
licensing restrictions under the Export Administration regula-
tions. 1
The Department of State also became involved in these
preconference proceedings, informing Dr. Vossen that it was con-
cerned about Commerce Department instructions that foreign in-
vitees sign written assurances. Further pressure from the State
Department resulted in the American Vacuum Society disinviting
the Polish, Hungarian, and Soviet scientists who had planned to
attend the Bubble Memory Conference. Although the State
Department had no objection to three scientists from the People's
Republic of China attending the meeting, 2 on February 19, one
day prior to the opening session of the conference, the Depart-
ment of Commerce notified the Vacuum Society and Dr. Vossen
that the Chinese could not attend. Furthermore, all foreign par-
" Government Bans Soviets from A. VS. and O.S.A. Meetings, PHYSICS TODAY 81-83
(Apr. 1980).
2 Letter from Kent N. Knowles, Director of the Office of Export Administration to John
L. Vossen, President of the American Vacuum Society (February 14, 1980), excerpted in
PHYSICS TODAY, Apr. 1980, at 81-83.
29 Id.
"' Feds Defend Bubble Meddle, SCIENCE 577 (May 9, 1980).




ticipants would be required to sign written assurances regarding
transfers to other countries before they could be admitted to the
conference." Commerce Department officials reminded Dr. Vossen
and the AVS of the penalties for violation of the Export Ad-
ministration Act and its accompanying regulations.,
At the conference registration, approximately thirty foreign in-
vitees signed the required written assurance. On February 21, the
second day of the conference, the Department of Commerce
relented and permitted the Chinese scientists to attend upon the
condition that they too sign a written assurance. 5 This pledge was
similar to that required of the other foreign participants,
although, not surprisingly, the list of countries to which re-
exports were prohibited did not include the People's Republic of
China.3M
In summary, the Department of Commerce determined that the
technical data regulations applied to the Bubble Memory Con-
ference for the following reasons: (1) the information to be
disseminated was "technical data" as defined in section 379.1(a) of
the Act; (2) the technical data would be "exported" since foreign
nationals were participating in the meeting; (3) the meeting was
not an "open conference"; and (4) licensing and written assurance
provisions applied because the technical data were not generally
available to the public and the technical information was scientific
data directly and significantly related to design, production, or
utilization in industrial processes.
During and after the conference, organizers of the meeting and
interested scientists argued that many of these conclusions were
incorrect. Herman Feshbach, President of the American Physical
Society, pointed out that discussions at the conference dealt solely
with "scientific information that is either published, or about to be
3 The written assurance read as follows:
The undersigned assures the American Vacuum Society that information ob-
tained at the First International Conference on Bubble Memory Materials and
Process Technology will not be divulged to Nationals of the following countries,
unless prior authorization is obtained from the Office of Export Administration:
Rumania, Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, German Democratic
Republic (including East Berlin), Hungary, Laos, Latvia, The Mongolian People's
Republic, People's Republic of China (excluding Republic of China), U.S.S.R.,
Lithuania, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Cuba.
Id, at 82.
3' See note 12 supra.
' Government Bans Soviets from A. VS. and O.S.A. Meetings, supra note 27, at 81-83.
' Letter from John L. Vossen, President of the American Vacuum Society, to Li Jia-
Xiang, of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations (Feb. 29, 1980).
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published, in the open literature. 13 7 Dr. Vossen argued that the in-
formation disseminated at the meeting was not in any way sen-
sitive or proprietary, but in the public domain. He noted that "in-
dustry, in its own self-interest, proscribes release of proprietary
information in any form, far more stringently than the
bureaucracy ever could. 38 Other conference organizers and
numerous scientists agreed that none of the representatives of
the competing firms at the conference would have divulged
anything the others did not already know 9.3 The government's
position was that the meeting discussed manufacturing pro-
cedures and unpublished data concerning high technology on the
embargoed list 0 for export.4'
Conference organizers also objected strenuously to the deter-
mination that the Bubble Memory Conference was not "open." '42 It
was pointed out that the meeting was advertised widely and that
there were no restrictions as to applications for admission.43 The
Commerce Department focused on the fact that only one hundred
persons were invited."
Aside from the controversy as to which particular provisions of
the regulations were applicable, organizers of the meeting and
other interested scientists voiced concern regarding the impact of
the export restraints upon scientific freedom and achievement.
Feshbach stated that the Commerce Department's actions would
discourage scientific efforts in the United States, and would deter
Western European and Japanese scientists from attending con-
ferences in the United States.3 Dr. Vossen went further, con-
cluding that the Commerce Department had jeopardized the
future of international technical meetings in the United States,
and had endangered the existence of most technical societies."
" Letter from Herman Feshbach, President of the American Physical Society, to Cyrus
Vance, Secretary of State (Mar. 11, 1980).
' Letter from John L. Vossen to Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce (Mar. 11,
1980).
3 Feds Defend Bubble Meddle, supra note 31, at 577.
,0 The embargoed list referred to is the Commerce Department Commodity Control List,
incorporated by reference into the Export Administration Regulations at 5 C.F.R. § 399.1
(1980).
" Government Bans Soviets from A. VS. and O.S.A. Meetings, supra note 27, at 82.
42 The regulations do not define the term "open conference."
," Letter from John L. Vossen to Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce (Mar. 17,
1980).
" Government Bans Soviets from A. V.S. and O.S.A. Meetings, supra note 27, at 81.
'5 Letter from Herman Feshbach, President of the American Physical Society, to Philip
M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce (March 11, 1980).




The foregoing examination of the application of the Export Ad-
ministration Technical Data Regulations provides an indication of
the potential constitutional problems inherent in the regulations.
Restraints were imposed on activities that consisted primarily of
lecturing and presenting scientific papers. A government agency
intervened in what was described as merely "a forum for scien-
tists to talk to scientists."47 The free flow of scientific information
was restricted by licensing procedures that could be characterized
as arbitrary; the regulations, which facilitated the censorship of
expression, contain no procedures for judicial review. Further-
more, questions of overbroad application are presented. The
validity of such a system of export controls is indeed questionable.
The balance of this discussion focuses on these first amendment
issues.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
A. The Degree of Protection for "Technical Data Speech"
In any analysis of first amendment issues, a threshold question
is whether first amendment protections are applicable to a par-
ticular situation. In the context discussed herein, it must be deter-
mined whether speech pertaining to technical data should be af-
forded such protection. If the first amendment does reach this
type of speech, the question then becomes whether it should
receive full or only limited protection. In other words, where does
scientific speech fit on what has been characterized as a spectrum
of first amendment protection?
The general rule is that "governmental bodies may not
prescribe the form or content of individual expression.''48
Nonetheless, a number of exceptions have developed over the
years. Obscenity is not protected by the first amendment.49
Fighting words also fall within the category of unprotected
speech. 0 Defamation has never received first amendment protec-
tion,5" and speech that incites others to engage in unlawful action
has also been denied protection by the Supreme Court of the
United States. 2 In view of the fact that the dissemination of
,7 Government Bans Soviets from A. VS. and O.S.A. Meetings, supra note 27, at 82.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
sI Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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technical data does not come within any of these exceptions, one
may conclude that such expression is entitled to some degree of
first amendment protection.
Under traditional analysis, all speech, other than those cate-
gories deemed to be unprotected, is entitled to full first amend-
ment protection. When government does attempt to suppress
speech, the strict scrutiny test is applied, and a presumption of
unconstitutionality attaches. Only a compelling state interest is
sufficient to overcome the presumption and sustain restraints.53
The Supreme Court, however, recently has departed from such
analysis in its treatment of commercial speech. Indeed, only an in-
termediate degree of protection has been afforded commercial
speech. Therefore, additional issues that must be addressed are
whether scientific and technological information is to be con-
sidered commercial speech, and if not, whether such speech
should receive a similar degree of protection.
In Bigelow v. Virginia,' the Supreme Court first suggested that
commercial speech was entitled to constitutional protection.
Bigelow published an advertisement in his newspaper concerning
the availability of abortions in New York. He was convicted under
a Virginia statute, which made it unlawful to encourage the pro-
curing of an abortion by the circulation of any publication. In
reversing the conviction, the Court stated that "the fact that the
particular advertisement in appellant's newpaper had commercial
interests did not negate all first amendment guarantees."55 One
year later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,' the Court unequivocally held for the
first time that the first amendment protects commercial speech.
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, a Virginia law that prohibited
licensed pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices
was invalidated. In announcing an intermediate degree of protec-
tion for commercial speech, the Court balanced asserted state in-
terests and the first amendment speech interest. Although the
consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information
was addressed (i.e., the Court recognized the first amendment's
applicability to the recipient of communication as well as to its
source), the Court specified that some forms of commercial speech
regulation would be permissible.
s TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-8, at 602-04.
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
5 I& at 818.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,7 the Court struck down a ban
on advertising by attorneys. It was emphasized, however, that
government can regulate truthfulness in commercial speech.
Advertising of routine services was permissible, but not advertis-
ing as to the quality of those services. Thus, although attorney
advertising can be regulated, it may not be suppressed totally. In
Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Association,' the Court held that a
state may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person. This
decision reaffirmed the position that commercial speech is entitled
to a limited degree of first amendment protection and that it is
subject to regulation in furtherance of important governmental in-
terests. The Court stressed the fact that commercial speech oc-
cupies a "subordinate position in the scale of first amendment
values. . .
In a recent commercial speech decision, Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York,10 the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the New York Public Ser-
vice Commission's ban on promotional advertising by electric
utilities. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, noted that
although commercial speech receives less protection than other
constitutionally guaranteed expression, "[we] have rejected the
highly paternalistic view that government has complete power to
suppress or regulate commercial speech." 1
It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court has not
specifically defined commercial speech in any of its decisions. In
Central Hudson, Justice Powell referred to "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," 2
and "speech proposing a commercial transaction."63 However, the
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
5, Id at 456.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
', Id. at 563. Powell enunciated a four-part test for commercial speech cases: (1) deter-
mine whether the commercial speech is misleading or concerns unlawful activity (if so, then
no first amendment protection); (2) decide whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial; (3) if the interest is substantial, determine whether the regulation directly ad-
vances that governmental interest; and (4) ascertain whether the regulation is more exten-
sive than is necessary to serve that interest. The Court noted that the speech was not
misleading and that it did not relate to unlawful activity. The state interest in conserving
energy was held to be substantial, and the Court determined that the Public Service Com-
mission order did directly advance that interest. The Court invalidated the regulation
under part four of the announced test, since it was more extensive than was necessary to
serve the governmental interest.
"2 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
w Id.
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Court did not expressly adopt either phrase as a definition of com-
mercial speech. Thus, because all of the commercial speech cases
to date have dealt with advertising in some context, the only
definitive conclusion that can be drawn is that advertising is com-
mercial speech. A determination as to whether the category is
more inclusive must await further word from the Supreme Court.
Speech relating to scientific and technological information ob-
viously is not merely a form of advertising. Such communication,
however, does go to a limited scientific group and cannot be
categorized as speech that is political in nature, which has always
received a preferred status. On the other hand, using the Bubble
Memory Conference as an example, dissemination of the technical
data occurred only through discussion. There was nq advertising
nor was there any immediate connection to a commercial transac-
tion. Such factors lead one to question whether technical data
speech should be characterized as commercial speech.
Even if scientific speech in such a context is not classified as
commercial speech, one might argue that it should be afforded a
similar degree of intermediate protection. If so, then presumably
a test similar to the one announced in Central Hudson would con-
trol. Government restriction would be permissible if there is a
substantial state interest in regulating the communication, the
regulation directly advanced that interest, and the restraints
were no more extensive than necessary to serve the governmen-
tal interest. The technical data regulations might survive a facial
challenge under such a test, but application of the regulations to
specific situations, such as scientific conferences, raises more dif-
ficult questions. In particular, application of the regulations to the
Bubble Memory Conference may violate the last part of the Cen-
tral Hudson test.
It is arguable that information of a scientific or technological
nature should be afforded full first amendment protection, or at
least a higher degree of protection than that afforded commercial
speech. Ferguson, who has recently written on the subject of
science and the first amendment, favors the latter suggestion."
He focuses on the following language in Miller v. California: "The
First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have ...
scientific value. . . ."1 Ferguson suggests that the Supreme Court
Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639
(1979).
" Id. at 644 n.19 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
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is now "moving toward a hierarchial view of the first amendment,
a view that assigns different levels of constitutional protection to
different kinds of expression."6 Commercial speech is cited as an
example of this trend. Ferguson, however, argues that scientific
speech should receive more protection than commercial speech.
Among the reasons offered for this position are that scientists
have strong individual interests in the free exchange of scientific
data and ideas; the interests are more intellectual than economic
(commercial speech being purely economic); that the public has
strong interests in the free flow of scientific information; and that
scientific expression is essential to intelligent public decisionmak-
ing.6
Regardless of whether speech relating to technical data is given
protection similar to that of commercial speech, more than com-
mercial speech but less than full protection, or full first amend-
ment protection, the governmental interests in imposing re-
straints obviously must be considered. The state interest will
have to be at least substantial, and possibly even compelling. As
to the facial validity of the Export Administration Act's technical
data regulations, the issue is whether the asserted national securi-
ty and foreign policy interests meet such a standard. The fact that
technical data may provide the technology to develop or improve
the military capabilities of other nations may be sufficient
justification to sustain the regulations. When applied to specific
situations, however, such as the discussion of technological issues
and techniques at scientific conferences, the validity of the regula-
tions is more questionable. In such a context, imposition of
restraints on national security or foreign policy grounds may
often be neither compelling nor substantial.
B. Potential First Amendment Challenges to Technical Data
Regulations
1. The Exporting of Technical Data as "Conduct"
In United States v. O'Brien," the Supreme Court held that the
66 Id. at 644-45.
67 I& at 647.
6 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration certificate in
front of a crowd in order to demonstrate his antiwar beliefs. In affirming his conviction
under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, the Supreme Court rejected
O'Brien's argument that his conduct amounted to symbolic speech and should be protected
by the first amendment. The Court explained that the statute regulated specific conduct
1981] 575
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first amendment does not protect all modes of communication of
ideas by conduct. The general rule for symbolic speech cases was
stated as follows: "[A] government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it ... furthers an important or substantial government
interest, if the government interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
first amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to the
futherance of that interest."69
In O'Brien, the Court noted that a statute designed to suppress
communication could not be sustained as a regulation of noncom-
municative conduct. Three years later, in Cohen v. California,"
the Court ruled that a conviction resting solely on speech and not
upon separately identifiable conduct could not stand. From these
decisions, it is difficult to assert that a scientist who speaks to a
conference on a technological subject is engaged in the "conduct"
of exporting technical data. Clearly, there is a substantial speech
interest in such a case. Furthermore, although there are legiti-
mate non-speech interests (national security and foreign policy),
the impact upon speech is too great to be incidental and thus ap-
pears invalid.
Apart from the application of the technical data regulations to
scientific meetings, restrictions that control the conduct of export-
ing technical information would seem to be permissible under the
O'Brien rationale. United States v. Edler Industries, Inc.71 il-
lustrates such a valid restraint."2 In Edler, an aerospace manufac-
turing and engineering firm applied to the Office of Munitions
Control for licenses to export specific technical knowledge to two
French firms. This technology, which dealt with tape wrapping
and carbon/carbon composites, had direct application to the pro-
duction of missiles. Although the licenses were denied, Edler pro-
ceeded to export the technology. The district court convicted the
defendants, and although the court of appeals reversed and re,
manded for a new trial, it agreed that the government has the
power to preclude United States firms from entering into
having no connection with speech. While noting that it saw nothing particularly expressive
about O'Brien's conduct, the Court emphasized that draft registration certificate burning
could be regulated because a substantial governmental interest would be furthered, i.e., the
efficient functioning of the Selective Service system.
Id, at 377.
70 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
7, 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
72 Note that this case dealt with regulations on technical data under the Mutual Security
Act of 1954 and not the Export Administration Act.
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agreements with foreign corporations or governments for the pur-
pose of aiding in the production of arms, ammunition, and other
implements of war. However, the court suggested that in some
contexts the dissemination of certain technical information might
be protected by the first amendment. Thus, although holding that
the defendants had engaged in unprotected conduct, the court
recognized that there could be instances in which the dissemina-
tion of technical data would constitute protected speech.
2. The Overbreadth Doctrine
The Export Administration regulations on technical data may
also be susceptible to challenge on overbreadth grounds. The
Supreme Court has applied the overbreadth doctrine to statutes
in which there is an overlap into an area of constitutional protec-
tions. The doctrine was developed because an overbroad law
tends to deter constitutionally protected speech or activity. To
avoid this chilling effect, the court invalidates the statute on its
face. A litigant may raise an overbreadth claim, even though the
speech or conduct of the particular plaintiff may not itself be pro-
tected by the first amendment. The litigant in this position argues
that the statute must be struck down because it could be applied
to restrict speech that cannot be constitutionally burdened. Ex-
ceptions to the overbreadth doctrine have been noted for symbolic
speech,"3 speech of military personnel, 4 and commercial speech.
" See Shaman, The First Amendment Rule Against Overbreadth, 52 TEMP. L. Q. 259
(1979). The limitation of the application of the rule against overbreadth in symbolic speech
cases occurred in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). In that case, three employees
of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission challenged a section of Oklahoma's Merit System
of Personnel Administration Act. Appellants conceded that the section, which restricts the
political activities of the State's classified civil servants, covered their own activities.
However, they claimed that it also applied "to such allegedly protected political expression
as the wearing of political buttons or the displaying of bumper stickers." Id. at 609-10. The
Supreme Court determined that the overbreadth doctrine was not applicable and upheld
the statute. The reasoning for the decision was that: "Where conduct and not merely
speech is involved . . .overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615. Thus, the
statute was admitted to be overbroad since it prohibited protected activities such as the
wearing of political buttons and displaying of bumper stickers. However, because the over-
breadth was not substantial, the Court refused to strike down the statute on its face.
Overbreadth doctrine as applied to speech by military personnel has also been limited
by the Supreme Court. In Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court rejected a
challenge on overbreadth grounds of articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Noting the difference between military and civilian society, the Court determined
that a statute that might marginally infringe upon first amendment values should not be in-
validated on its face when the "remainder of the statute covers a whole range of easily iden-
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As to the last category, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,'5 the
Court indicated that invalidation on overbreadth grounds will oc-
cur only if it is shown that the commercial speech at issue is enti-
tled to first amendment protection. The test announced in Central
Hudson"6 expanded this limitation of the rule against overbreadth
in the commercial speech context-substantial governmental in-
terest will justify regulation of constitutionally protected commer-
cial speech as long as the restriction is no more extensive than is
necessary to serve the asserted state interest. In the Court's
view, such a limitation is acceptable because commercial speech
"is a hardy breed of expression that is not 'particularly suscepti-
ble to being crushed by overbroad regulation.'""
In regard to the technical data regulations, overbreadth
analysis should be applicable due to the fact that arguably pro-
tected speech is affected. If the scientific and technological infor-
mation controlled by the regulations is held to be commercial
speech, conventional overbreadth rules would not apply. If,
however, a greater degree of first amendment protection is af-
forded such speech, the overbreadth doctrine in its traditional
form would appear to govern. A determination of overbreadth
would then result in holding the regulations facially unconstitu-
tional. Such a conclusion could be justified because the overbroad
licensing scheme under the regulations deters speech; it could
have a chilling effect upon the exercise of first amendment
freedoms. On the other hand, in considering a facial challenge, the
Supreme Court has noted that "it is necessary to proceed with
caution and restraint, as invalidation may result in unnecessary
interference with a state regulatory program."78 A determination
of facial invalidity would undoubtedly impede and create havoc in
the existing system of export controls. It thus appears unlikely
that a court would strike down the technical data regulations on
overbreadth grounds.
3. Standards in Permit and License Cases
The Supreme Court has rendered numerous decisions in cases
tifiable and constitutionally proscribable ... conduct .... Id. at 760. One commentator has
expressed the view that the Court's treatment of overbreadth in Parker indicates that "a
high degree of overbreadth perhaps even more than substantial overbreadth, will be
tolerated in cases involving military regulations." Shaman, supra note 73, at 259.
" 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
" Central Hudson v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
" Id. at 564 n.6 (1980).
" Erzonoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
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in which restrictions were imposed upon the exercise of first
amendment freedoms through the use of licensing schemes and
permit requirements. 9 The rules established in these cases may
be applicable by analogy to the technical data regulations of the
Export Administration Act. As the Court stated in Staub v. City
of Baxley,
It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that
an ordinance which . . . makes the peaceful enjoyment of
freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon
the uncontrolled will of an official-as by requiring a permit or
license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of
such official-is an unconstitutional censorship or prior
restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. s
An example of an impermissible permit or license requirement
is illustrated by Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham.' The
defendant was convicted under a Birmingham ordinance, which
made it unlawful to participate in any parade, procession, or other
public demonstration without first obtaining a permit from the City
Commission. In striking down the ordinance, the Court noted that
"a law subjecting the exercise of first amendment freedoms to the
prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite
standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional."82
79 In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), an ordinance requiring a permit from
the City Manager before advertising or other types of literature could be distributed was
held to be invalid on its face. The Court found the permit requirement impermissible
because "it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to
license and censorship." Id. at 451. Similarly, a municipal ordinance that prohibited solicita-
tion, and distribution of circulars by canvassing from house to house unless licensed by the
police, was struck down in Schneider v. State. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Particularly troublesome
to the Court was the fact that the ordinance gave police total discretion in granting
licenses. In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), the defendants were convicted
under a New Hampshire statute for participating in a parade upon a public street without a
license. In affirming the convictions, the Supreme Court noted that the licensing board did
not have unfettered discretion to deny the right to march or speak, but could only regulate
the time, place, and manner of the parade for reasons of safety and convenience. In a
Jehovah's Witness case, Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), appellants were convicted
for violating a New York City ordinance that made it unlawful to hold public worship
meetings on the streets without having first obtained a permit from the City Police Com-
missioner. The convictions were overturned by the Supreme Court because the Commis-
sioner had discretionary power to control in advance the exercise of first amendment
rights. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Vinson stated that "we have consistently con-
demned licensing systems which vest in an administrative official discretion to grant or
withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public places." I&
at 294.
" 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958).
" 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
SId. at 150-51 (emphasis added).
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The only standard in the ordinance upon which the commission
was to base permit issuance decisions was phrased in terms of
"public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals
or convenience." Such guidance, according to the Court, provided
members of the City Commission with impermissible discretion.
The case law indicates that for the government to require a
license or permit before first amendment rights may be exercised,
the licensing authority must have no discretion to discriminate on
the basis of content. License denial is permissible only as a
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation. If the dissemina-
tion of technical data is held to be entitled to some degree of pro-
tection under the first amendment, then these principles would
appear to be applicable. In its capacity as the licensing authority,
the Department of Commerce is guided only by the general stan-
dards of national security and foreign policy. A degree of ar-
bitrariness inheres in the administration of the export controls
and the Commerce Department has broad discretion in deciding
whether a license is to be required in a particular situation. Fur-
thermore, such individual determinations are obviously content
based. Thus, the application of the license and written assurance
requirements to situations relating to the dissemination of
technological and scientific information infringes upon a protected
speech element and may be unconstitutional. An example is the
mere discussion of technological issues and techniques at scientific
meetings such as the Bubble Memory Conference.
4. Lack of Judicial Review
The validity of the Export Administration Act's technical data
regulations may also be questioned due to a statutory provision
precluding judicial review of Commerce Department licensing
decisions.8 In Freedman v. Maryland," a Maryland statute requir-
ing submission of films to the State Board of Censors for licensing
prior to exhibition at theatres was challenged. The Supreme
'Court held the statute unconstitutional because no system of pro-
cedural safeguards existed. The Court ruled that the following
safeguards are required when allegedly unprotected speech 5 is
50 U.S.C. app. § 2412 (Supp. III 1979). Most functions exercised under the Export Ad-
ministration Act are also exempted from Administrative Procedure Act review. Id.
380 U.S. 51 (1965).
In this particular case, the Board made determinations as to whether films were
obscene.
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subjected to licensing schemes and censorship: (1) prior submis-
sion of the movie can be required, but the burden of proof on the
issue of obscenity is on the censor, (2) the administrative review
board must make its determination within a specified and brief
period, and (3) a prompt final judicial determination as to the cor-
rectness of a finding of obscenity must be assured.86
In National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie,8
the Supreme Court added the requirement of prompt appellate
review to the Freedman list of procedural safeguards. In Skokie,
an injunction was entered against the National Socialist Party by
the Circuit Court of Cook County.88 In reversing the Illinois
Supreme Court's denial of a stay, the United States Supreme
Court held that "if a state seeks to impose a restraint of this kind,
it must provide strict procedural safeguards . .. including im-
mediate appellate review .... -"'
In the cases considered above, licensing or censorship schemes
imposed upon allegedly protected speech were held to be imper-
missible because specific procedural safeguards were not
available. Under the Export Administration Regulations on
technical data, a similar system of licensing is involved and poten-
tially protected speech is affected. The Act exempts licensing
decisions from judicial review under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, thus allowing for possible arbitrary decisions by the
" 380 U.S. 51 (1965). In Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971), an administrative censorship
scheme was struck down as a violation of the Freedman standards. The Court emphasized
that the rules announced in Freedman are necessary because of the danger that a censor or
licensing authority will be less responsive than a court in protecting first amendment in-
terests. In another censorship case, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
(1975), the Court reiterated that whenever there is content based review, the procedural
guarantees of Freedman come into play. In Conrad, petitioners sought to produce the play
Hair in a privately-owned Chattanooga theatre under lease to the city. The rejection of
their application was held to be unconstitutional since no procedure for prompt judicial
review was available.
" 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
" The order prohibited the Party from
marching, walking or parading in the uniform of the National Socialist Party of
America; marching, walking or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on
or off their person; distributing pamphlets or displaying any materials which in-
cite or promote hatred against persons of Jewish faith or ancestry or hatred
against persons of any faith or ancestry, race or religion.
Id. at 43.
89 Id. at 44. The validity of a Texas nuisance statute as applied to obscenity was at issue
in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308 (1980). The statute authorized
restraints of indefinite duration on the exhibition of films that had not been finally ad-
judicated as obscene. The Court, in a per curiam opinion, held the statute unconstitutional
because it was procedurally deficient under Freedman.
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Department of Commerce as to whether licenses are required.
Nor has the burden of proof been allocated. Whether the Depart-
ment of Commerce or the "exporter" must prove that the
technological information is detrimental to United States national
security and foreign policy interests is unclear. Similar uncertain-
ties exist as to the burden of proof on issues such as public
availability of the technical data, "open" conferences, and whether
the data have military application.
There is also no provision for judicial review in the export Ad-
ministration technical data regulations." If the agency determines
that the regulations are applicable, or if a license is denied, then
general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is the
only available judicial remedy. For instances such as the Bubble
Memory Conference, the need for expeditious judicial review ap-
pears to be at least as significant as in the censorship and licens-
ing cases considered above. Of primary concern is that promotion
of United States national security may be the sole concern, and
that protection of possible first amendment rights may not even
be considered. Thus, the technical data regulations as applied in
certain contexts may be unconstitutional due to the lack of Freed-
man and Skokie procedural safeguards.
5. Prior Restraint
A court order enjoining one from speaking or publishing
because of what is to be said or written is the classic example of a
prior restraint. The Supreme Court has taken a dim view of such
restrictions, noting that "prior restraints on speech and publica-
tion are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on
first amendment rights." The Court has established a strong pre-
sumption against the validity of such restraints, and a heavy
burden of showing justification for the prior restraint has been
imposed upon the government.2 Prior restraints, however, are not
unconstitutional per se. The Court has continually refused to hold
that prior restraints may never be imposed, holding instead that
prior restraints are permissible only in certain limited and excep-
tional cases."
The only review available under the regulations is an appeal to the Assistant
Secretary for "reconsideration." See 45 Fed. Reg. 85,447, 85,448 (1980)(to be codified in 15
C.F.R. § 389.2(a)).
" Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
" New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
" In dicta, in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Court suggested that an excep-
tion to the general rule against prior restraints may exist when the nation is at war.
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Although the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of prior
restraint on numerous occasions, 94 its applicability in the national
security realm is especially relevant for present purposes. In New
York Times Co. v. United States,95 the government sought to en-
join publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times
and Washington Post, ostensibly for national security reasons. In
a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the govern-
ment had not met its heavy burden of justifying the restraint.
Justices Black and Douglas, in concurring opinions, stated that
even limited exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine should not
be allowed. Justice Brennan indicated that he would permit a very
narrow class of exceptions, but only upon "governmental allega-
tion and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and im-
mediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling
the safety of a transport already at sea. ... "96 Justices Stewart
and White agreed that prior restraints would be permissible only
in a single, extremely narrow class of cases. It was emphasized by
Justice White that even a showing that "revelation of these
documents will do substantial damage to public interest" would be
insufficient to overcome the strong presumption against prior
restraints. 9
It appears that the Court in New York Times applied a variant
of the clear and present danger test. The determination focused
upon whether publication of the material was a danger to interna-
tional relations and United States national security. Four factors
were considered by the Court: (1) the immediacy of the danger; (2)
whether the information was otherwise available; (3) whether the
injunction would be effective; and (4) the seriousness of the
danger. Even though the information at issue was classified top-
secret and national security interests could have been damaged,
the Court refused to sanction the prior restraint.
In a district court opinion relating to national security, a prior
restraint was upheld. In United States v. Progressive, Inc.,98 the
government sought to enjoin defendants from publishing an arti-
cle entitled "The H-Bomb Secret; How We Got It, Why We're
Telling It." It was claimed that publication would lead to prolifera-
" See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Organization For a Bet-
ter Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); and Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
" 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 730-31 (White, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring).
467 F. Supp. 990 (D. Wis. 1979).
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tion of nuclear weapons capability. Judge Warren agreed, con-
cluding that "publication of the technical information on the
hydrogen bomb contained in the article is analogous to publication
of troop movements or locations in time of war and falls within the
extremely narrow exception to the rule against prior restraint.",
Citing New York Times, Judge Warren determined that the
possibility of direct, immediate, and irreparable harm to the
United States had been demonstrated sufficiently by the govern-
ment.
While on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, two government
documents containing the same information as that of the Pro-
gressive article were discovered on the open shelves of the Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory. After a letter containing similar in-
formation from a computer programmer to Senator Percy was
published by the Madison Press Connection, the government
dropped its case. The Seventh Circuit vacated Judge Warren's
preliminary injunction and The Progressive published the
article.' ° Thus, since the article did not contain secret informa-
tion, but only data already in the public domain, the prior
restraint was unjustifiably imposed. It has been suggested that
Judge Warren applied a less stringent standard than New York
Times requires, ie., "a standard that required a showing that
unusually serious harm might result from publication.... 101 Due
to these circumstances, The Progressive case deserves only
limited precedential value.
Two recent Supreme Court cases upholding prior restraints are
Brown v. Glines02 and United States v. Snepp.0 3 However, their
applicability and sway in the context of restrictions on the dis-
semination of technical data is attenuated. In Brown v. Glines, the
Supreme Court sustained Air Force regulations requiring mem-
bers of the Service to obtain approval from their commanders
before circulating petitions on Air Force bases. Recognizing that
the military is a "specialized society separate from civilian
society,"1 the Court has repeatedly tolerated restrictions upon
Id. at 996.
... For a full account of the events, see Tribe & Remes, Some Reflections on The Pro-
gressive Case: Publish and Perish?, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, 20 (Mar. 1980). See also Cheh,
The Progressive Case and the Atomic Energy Act: Waking to the Dangers of Government
Information Controls, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 163 (1980).
101 Tribe & Remes, supra note 100, at 24.
102 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
... 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
10' 444 U.S. at 354.
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first amendment rights of military personnel, which would be un-
constitutional in a nonmilitary context.
In Snepp, the Court also upheld a prior restraint, but in a set-
ting even more narrow than Brown v. Glines. Snepp, a former
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent, published a book on CIA
activities in Vietnam without submitting it to the Agency for pre-
publication review. As an express condition of his employment,
Snepp agreed not to publish any information concerning CIA ac-
tivities without prior approval from the Agency. The government
sued to enforce the agreement. In a per curiam opinion, the
Supreme Court enjoined future breaches of the contract and im-
posed a constructive trust on Snepp's profits. The Court held that
the prior restraint was necessary to protect the safety of CIA
agents and to ensure the effective operation of the foreign in-
telligence service.
Snepp seems to represent only a limited holding in respect to
the prior restraint doctrine. A narrow reading of the case is
necessary due to at least two factors: (1) the Court is less reluc-
tant to uphold restraints upon first amendment rights of govern-
ment employees, and (2) Snepp signed a contract promising not to
publish any material dealing with CIA activities without prepub-
lication clearance from the Agency.
In conclusion, the prior restraint doctrine appears to be ap-
plicable to the restrictions imposed by the Department of Com-
merce upon the dissemination of technical data. ' s Although licens-
ing and written assurance requirements do not amount to an in-
junction against speech or publication, the restraints are
analogous. At issue is whether the asserted national security and
foreign policy interests are sufficient reasons to suppress first
amendment rights. Under the New York Times test, it seems that
the Commerce Department would have to demonstrate clearly
that the dissemination of technological information would enable
other nations to develop their military capabilities. In a case such
as Edler,0 6 it would not be troublesome to meet such a burden.
However, to justify restrictions upon first amendment rights
sought to be exercised at a scientific conference is considerably
,o Note that prior restraint principles may not apply if the technical information con-
trolled by the Export Administration regulations is afforded protection similar to commer-
cial speech. In Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24, and in Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 571 n.13, the Court indicated that commercial speech may be an exception to the
general rule against prior restraints.
'" 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
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more difficult. Information to be discussed rarely will be secret
(the regulations under consideration do not even control classified
information), and it is doubtful that any immediate or grave
danger will result. Thus, application of export controls to the
dissemination of technical data may, in some contexts, amount to
an unconstitutional prior restraint.
V. CONCLUSION
The Export Administration regulations on technical data affect
first amendment speech interests and may therefore be suscepti-
ble to challenge both facially and as applied to specific situations.
Restrictions have been imposed upon the dissemination of
technological information in order to protect United States na-
tional security. Undoubtedly, this is an important reason for the
imposition of such restraints. In fact, in a recent case, the
Supreme Court made it clear that "the Government has a compel-
ling interest in protecting . . . the secrecy of information impor-
tant to our national security .. ."10 However, the Court also has
emphasized that first amendment inquiry is not foreclosed
whenever the term "national security" is invoked as justification
for suppression of speech or press. It is in this context-first
amendment freedoms versus national security interests-that the
issue of the validity of the technical data regulations must be
reviewed. 08
Technological information is not merely advertising and would
not appear to be confined solely to the realm of commercial
speech. Thus, scientific speech may be afforded full first amend-
ment protection. If not, then under a sliding-scale analysis, speech
relating to technical data would presumably receive a greater
degree of protection than commercial speech and the asserted na-
tional security and foreign policy interests would have to be
, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
os In another context, ie. passport revocation, the Supreme Court recently came down
on the side of national security. Haig, Secretary of State v. Agee, 69 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981). In
reversing the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Justice Burger wrote:
Assuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protections reach beyond our na-
tional'boundaries, Agee's First Amendment claim has no foundation. The revoca-
tion of Agee's passport rests in part on the content of his speech: specifically, his
repeated disclosures of intelligence operations and names of intelligence person-
nel . . . To the extent the revocation of his passport operates to inhibit Agee, 'it
is an inhibition of action rather than of speech.
Id. (emphasis in original). Unlike the material, or data considered in this Note, the informa-
tion divulged by Mr. Agee was highly classified.
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substantial or even compelling. When the regulations are applied
to oral exchanges of information at scientific meetings, such as the
Bubble Memory Conference, such a standard would be difficult to
meet.
Under the O'Brien rationale, regulation of the conduct of ex-
porting technical data seems to be permissible. The same conclu-
sion, however, cannot be reached when discussion at scientific
conferences is restricted because substantial speech interests are
involved. Although promotion of United States national security
and foreign policy are clearly legitimate non-speech interests, the
incidental impact upon protected speech would appear to be in-
tolerable. The regulations may also be questioned on overbreadth
grounds. However, it is unclear whether such a facial challenge
would be successful. If the technical data controlled by the regula-
tions are held to be entitled to only a limited degree of first
amendment protection, traditional overbreadth rules would not
apply. The rules established by the Court in permit and license
cases provide a further means of challenging the technical data
regulations. The Department of Commerce has considerable dis-
cretion in determining whether licenses and written assurances
are to be required before technological information can be dissem-
inated. There is also no provision in the regulations for prompt
judicial or appellate review of administrative licensing decisions.
Neither is there any allocation of burden of proof in regard to
crucial issues. Since Freedman and Skokie require such pro-
cedural safeguards, it would seem that the technical data regula-
tions as applied in certain circumstances would be unconstitu-
tional. Furthermore, in some contexts, application of the reg-
ulations may amount to an impermissible prior restraint.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the regulations be revised
substantially to take into account the first amendment issues
discussed in this Note. As presently written and applied, the
regulations are susceptible to first amendment challenge on
numerous grounds.
Kenneth Kalivoda
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